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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY'S ALLEGED RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION* 
by 
Karl H. Potter 
Generalizations abouL Lhe genius of Indian philosophizing as contrasted wiLh 
Western ways of l.hinking have been not infrequently set forth in the past few 
decades. These contrasts have, to the best of my knowledge, until very recently 
been based on lhe assumption that :here is a peculiarly close relation between 
what goes on in Indian philosophy and the religious motivations of the Hindus 
and Buddhists who produced that philosophy. Such an interpretation was 
apparently accepted without question by the earliest Weslem expounders of 
Indian philosophy, and has been endorsed by generations of influential Indian 
scholars such as SarvepaJli Radhakrishnan, who writes: "Philosophy in India is 
essentially spirHuaJ." 1 (l refrain from adding other citations; they are so numer­
ous it  seems unnecessary t.o do so.) Many contemporary writers accept this 
interpretation of Indian ph�losophy, !.hough lbey may differ in their aUitude 
toward it. For example, Ninian Smart's main argumenL in a recent book is that 
"the main determinants of lhe metaphysical systems (of India) have been 
religious . . .  »_ 2 Smart's book seems predicated on the need for that thesis to be 
demonstrated. Agehananda Bharati, however writes "That there is no detbeol­
ogized philosophy in India is a fact hardly anyone would dispute . . . .  ,,3 
Despite Agehananda's confidence, however, something of lhe sort has been 
questioned in a number of recent publications. Some of these come from the 
pens of Marxist writers. For example, Professor N. P. Anikeev, of lhe Tnslitute of 
Philosophy in the Academy of Science, USSR, points to three "false notions in 
bourgeois literature" on Indian philosophy. These notions are ( 1 )  that "for 
India . . .  the worldly life . . .  is only a . . .  step forward towards ·spiritual enltight­
enment' "; (2) that "for India the ultimate reality can be real.ized only through 
mystic intuition"; and (3) that "Indian philosophy . . .  is totally indifferent t.o 
scientific methods of objectivity studying the external world . . . . ,,4 Anikeev 
proceeds t.o argue that Western scholars of Indian philosophy have taken two 
distinct attitudes toward what. they have mistakenly supposed to be the nature 
of Indian thought. Some, such as the German philosopher-scholars Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Max Muller and Paul Deussen, "try to ennoble (its) idealistic 
philosophy as the highest attainment of the spirilual culture of India."5 Then 
there have been those like Hegel who, "on the contrary, consider that Indian 
philosophy, because of its religious and mystic aspiration, does not deserve any 
serious altent.ion. "6 Anikeev recognizes a group of more insightful Indologists, 
including "most of Lhe Russian lndologists of the older generation," who see 
through the fallaciousness of the spiritualistic reading of Indian philosophy and 
who "endeavor Lo concenlrat.e aUenlion on its ralionaJ leachings."7 Sometimes, 
he complains, this sort of scholar goes t.o the other extreme, fancifully claiming 
scientific breakthroughs for Indian thought. Marxist scholars, he suggests, 
.. All future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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because of lheir willingness to recognize lhe materialistic elements in Indian 
philosophy and assess them appropriately, are in a unique position with regard 
to Lhis field of study. Anikeev hints Lhal the inability of many European scholars 
to recognize materialism in Indian philosophy ls connecled with their imperial· 
istic leanings. One might expect. him to say. though he doesn't, that in the case 
of Indian sd1olars their manner of reading Indian philosophy is related lo the 
privileged c.astc and class status of lhese scholars, who are generally members of 
castes high in lhc hierarchy. 
Support for the Marxist line of interpretation is provided in a recent work by 
an Indian rt.larxist Indologist. Debiprasad Challopadhyaya. In his book fodian 
A theism: A Marxist Analysis8 Chattopadhyaya shows in great detail that out· 
side of the Vedanta system� of the last millennium or so the Indian philosophi<'al 
systems have without exception been al least initially either agnostic or frankly 
atheistic. Indeed, he argues, the common position on the part of tradilional 
Indian philosophers was that God is a myth and not a salutary one al that. l\s 
Chattopadhyaya reads it, those philosophers did nol fuUy carry oul their mis­
sion, "which rould have been nothing but the full eradication of lhe idea of God 
from the Jndian mind," so that "Lhe idea of God survived-and survived in a big 
way-all the philosophical considerations urging for its rejection:•9 What the 
classical phi losophers lacked, Chatlopadhyaya suggests. was a method of showing 
how to outgrow lhe need for the notion or God. Since Marx provides lhat 
method, Chaltopadhyaya concludes, "the real inheritors of (the Indian philo­
sophical) tradition can slop nowhere short of the acceptance of Marxism." 10 
Marxists are nol the only writers who have recently called the tradirional 
interpretation of Indian philosophy into question. Dale Riefe , for example, in 
his book The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Philosophy l rehearses u story 
about the history of Indian thought which resembles Chattopadhyaya's. He 
seeks to show the presence o f  what he calls "naturalism" in the non· Vedantic 
systems, arguing that it can be discerned in all of those systems but "was nearly 
totally replaced by variol\.IS forms of idealism which lried to make pleasant an 
imaginary life when the natural one was frequently intolerable." 12 Riepe 
believes that there is nowadays a "naturalistic revival in India,, the hisloey of 
which "is still lo be written although it.s green shoots are visible ever} where.ul3 
Elsewhere Riepe has attac�ed whal he Lakes lo be a more traditional approach. 
in this case that of the present writer, for underestimating the imporlanee of 
materialistic philosophy. He writes that 11Jle (Potter) presu pposes lhat Indian 
philosophy may be interpreted without actual recourse to its cultural moor· 
ings,"1 4  and that "instead of giving us the cultural clues that might explain 
Indian philosophy, Potter defends the old . 
ethic�l-individualistic interpre­
lation.11 1 5 l n  contrast to the approach lo lnd1an philosophy as the soutc� of 
philosop/liae perennes, ar. approach whose probability of success he rat.es as 
slight,16 he counsels a socio-historical approac:h, e.g., by asking "why is lhe 
classical tradition being neglected (in India)?" a question whose answer requires 
"the rudiments of a philosophy of hislOIJ and considerable informalion in the 
area of the sociology of knowledge. Otherwise one is reduced to tbe impotence 
of psychical determination and the mystificalion of Lhe idealistic and spirilual-
160 3
Potter: Indian Philosophy's Alleged Religious Orientation
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1972
KARL H .  POTTE R 
islic history of ideas."17  
Similar reflections are found in  the writings of  the contemporary Indian 
philosopher Daya Krishna, once again commenting on the present writer's book 
among others he considers mistaken in their approach. In two articlesl8 he 
indicates a number of "myths,, about Indian philosophy. The fundamental one, 
he argues, is the notion that lndian philosophy has primarily lo do with spiritual 
liberation or moksa. This notion, he declares, "is treated as axiomatic by almost 
all who write or: the subject. H seems to require no proof for its establish­
ment. ,,19 Yet Daya believes that i t  does require proof, and that such proof can­
not be successfully provided. He concludes: 
Moksa, then, is not the exclusive concern of Indian philosophy. Nor is it . 
ils predominant concern, either. :i\lany of the thi nkers and many or the 
schools are not concerned with it even marginally. Many others are con­
cerned with it only in a peripheral manner. There are very few with whom 
it is a major concern and even they are concerned with it only in a philo­
sophical manner. The propagandistic statements by classical writers in the 
<'Ourse of their works, along with the failure to note that mollia may give 
rise lo genuinely philosophical problems as much as anything else, have 
created the myth that Indian philosophy is intrinsically and inalienably 
concerned with spiritual liberation and not. with what may be called philo­
sophical problems proper. H is lime that the myth be dispelled and Indian 
philosophy be treated seriously as philosophy proper. 20 
If my recapitulation of the arguments and positions or the several writers re­
viewed does nol itself show it, more extensive consultation of their writings indi­
cates that a number of distinct issues are involved here. The confluence in 
thought of, among those 1 have mentioned, a non-Indian Marxist, an Indian 
Marxist, a non-Indian non-Marxist and an Indian non-Marxist might give the im­
pression that a widespread revolution is occurring among scholars of lndian 
philosophy. At the least, we might say, t.here is some tendency on the part of 
Marxists to alt.empt a Lake-over of the subject, a tendency which is supported in 
various ways by contemporary philosophers writing about Indian philosophy 
who are not. al least avowedly, themselves Marxists. l think the impression of a 
consolidated position on the part of these writers is a misleading one, that several 
distinct issues need lo be untangled, and that the right approach is more com­
plicated than the simplistic "revolution in scholarship,, interpretation would 
allow. It may be worthwhile to make the effort here Lo untangle some of these 
matters and Lo explore a bit more deeply some of the most interesting of the 
issues raised. 
The general lhesis of all four of the writers whose views I have characterized 
might be summarized as involving the denial of Radhakrishnan's remark aboul 
Indian philosophy being "essentially spiritual." The tangle begins lo be evidenl 
when one considers Lhe several senses or aspects of lhe meaning of "spiritual" 
againsL which our four writers are reacting-senses or aspects which may be 
related but which are quite distinct on the face of them. I want now to separate 
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some of these meanings ard to consider the que'ition afresh in connection wilh 
some of Lhe strands. Some of the issues thus elicited tum out lo be both easily 
stated and relali\·ely easily settled: others are easil) stated, bul not so easily 
setlled; and still others not even easily staled. 
The terms "spiritual" and "'religious" are used in lhis sorl of discussion with· 
ouL any very specific distinction in their respeclivc scopes of application. One of 
the easily slated and relatively easi ly seltled issues has Lo do with a standard 
Western meaning of "religious", namely "t heislic". The kind of scholarship on 
Indian phtlosophy which Chattopadhy<1ya contro\'erts attempts to read into 
lndian philosophies a general tendency towards theism, so thal questions about 
the nature and existence of a Sll pre me being bulk large ill the al leged c·oncems or 
rndian phi.losophers. Chattopadhyaya convincingly shows that if one cou nls 
noses among the classical philosophical systems, using plausible principles of 
differentiation, one comes up wilh the finding thal the vast majority or those 
syslcms were at least initially agnostic or atheislk. 'I'hus, providing one slices in· 
to the history of Indian philosophy al a suitable moment, say, the seco nd cen· 
Lury A.D .. one finds Lhal Lhe major systems. extant al that time-Sa'!'khya, 
MTmamsa. Nyaya and Vaisesika. Jainism, the several schools of Buddhism, and 
Garv?ika-are none of lhem theistic. It is of comse importanl lhat one sJices at 
lhc right point in lime. as well as that the thesis is pul in terms of the number, 
rather than the importance or popularity, of the systems being compared. For if 
one slices instead at, say. the fourteenth centur} A. D. one finds Lhal Nyiya­
Vn1se�ika has become pronouncedly theistic, lhat Buddhism and Canika have 
disappeared, and that se,·eral varieties of theistic Vedanta have come to prom· 
inence. Furthermore, judging from lhe output of literature representing Lhe 
various schools during the last millennium, the theistic schools now nol only 
outnumber but far outweigh the non-Lheistic ones in imporlance and extent of 
inn uence. Thus one can accept Chattopadhya) a's claims, proper!) dated, with­
out having to deny Agehananda's previously.cited remark about lhe absence of 
any "delheologized11 philosophy in India today. 
Chatlopadhyaya does not deny this limitation on his thesis. bul he places his 
own peculiar evalualion upon it. Indian philosophy started atheisticallr and 
ended up theistic. This need not contradicl Chattopadhyaya's summary of his 
conclusion. "that the overwhelminy majority of significant Indian philosophers 
were in fact committed atheisls."2 for he retains lhe right to decide whom he 
wishes to consider significant Indian philosophers. And in addition he has, or 
course, a point lo make aboul the supposed Marxisl implications of Indian 
philosophy's history, as we have already seen. 'rhe link lo Marxism is this: lbaL 
since Indian philosophy is by nature atheistic, and sincP "the idea of God sir­
vived-and survived in a big way-all the philosophical considerations urging for 
its rejection," the theism of later times must hav<> "had its root somewhere oul· 
side the sphere of mere ph losophising." Chalto padhyaya traces lhal root in now 
familiar terms: reLigion, "�n effective palliative for Lhe people and Lherefore also 
an effet'tive lool for policing lhe stale,u22 came in India lo serve lo maintai11 Urn 
C'las..c;.slrucLure of society. Philosophical arguments were insufficient to break 
lheism1s hold, given these causes for its adoption. The only proper critique which 
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will have practical effect is the Marxist one. Marxist philosophy thus becomes 
the logical culmination of classical lndian philosophy. 
A good many or lhe historical claims involved in this account, it seems to me, 
are at present unsubstantiated and likely to remain so. It does seem to me lhal 
Challopadhyaya is in certain important respects right as against the majority of 
lndian and Western scholars. In the second century A.D., say, the vast majority 
of philosophers of whom we have any knowledge showed no signs in their 
philosophy of leanings toward theism. Chattopadhyaya cleverly brings out the 
fact that PurvamTmaipsa, usually cousidered the bastion of orthodox Hindu 
religion, in fact e:xplicitly argues that God is a myth. Chatlopadhyaya infers from 
this that the Vedas, whose exegesis is the main purpose of MTmal}'lsa. were like­
wise athcistk tracts. One need not accept this inference. Nevertheless, his 
reading of the Mlma!!'sa passages themselves is convincing. However, what we 
don't know is what the status of the Upanishadic philosophy was at that lime. H 
happens that outside of Badarayana's Vedanta- or Brahmasulras we do not have 
the works of any Vedanlist. until the sixth or seventh century A.o.23 There is 
evidence that nevertheless there were a number of philosophers who espoused 
the philosophy of the Upanishads, and it is reasonable to conjecture that the 
Corm taken in_this espousal may well have been lheislic, given the forms in which lhe later Vedantisls expounded the Upanishads. I suspect thal Chattopadhyaya 
would resist that conjecture, since on his principles the later theologizing of 
Vedanta would be a part of the general theologizing of all Indian philosophy. 
But it seems to me Lhe evidence is not there on either side. 
A similar lack of evidence obtains in connection with another important part 
of Chatlopadhyaya's claim, lhe part having to do with the supposed inlro· 
duction of theism lo police the state and maintain the class-structure. Marx's 
theories on this point are intriguing, but one should nol be seduced into 
accepting their application to a given historical case without some evidence. 
With respect lo its application to classical Indian society we have little or nothing 
Lo go on. Indeed, what little there is suggests that, far from theism being some­
thing introduced by the rulers to rationalize and maintain their superiority, it 
was in fact an indigenous belief of the masses lo which the Brahminical philos­
ophers, seeing through theistic claims, still had lo try lo accommodate them­
selves. Generally, the Marxist approach here runs the risk of defeating itself: 
backing the slaves in revolting against their masters, the Marxist may for dialecti­
cal reasons attribute lo the masters the beliefs and aspirations of the slaves, thus 
undermining the cogency of the proposed revolution. 
These same considerations seem to me to pertain to Riepe's arguments cited 
earlier. Riepe calls upon me and scholars of Indian philosophy to "explain 
Indian philosophy"; instead of doing t:iat, he complains, I give "the old elhical­
individualistic interpretation." l should counter that we just don't know enough 
Lo explain Indian philosophy. l t  is hard enough lo explain someone's philosophy 
even when he is present in the flesh: given the lack of knowledge about lndian 
history. and in particular about the state of the ordinary farmer, say, in classical 
Indian times, it seems to me lo b� hopeless to essay any explanation. In saying 
this, however, I must insist that an "explanation," as I understand it, involves 
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not only a theoretical reconstruclion but also data to back lhal reconstructiQn 
against its ri\'als. Riepe, I suspect. is asking not for an explanation in lhis �ense 
bul for a certain kind o f  reconstruct1on m default of data. a reconstruction 
which he thinks is JUSlified by appeal to an appropriate •·philosophy of hi;;tory 
and considerable informatbn in the area of lhe sociolog\ o f  knowledge." \\'bat 
he is really unhapp) about, I suppose, is that in reporting Indian philosophy as it 
1s found in the texts one is likel� lo "rnconstruct" it in terms of the ideology of 
the> elite whose texts they were. Yet if the texts really do rl'llect that ideolog)• it 
is nol bad history lo say so. whatever doubts one ma) ha\C' about the extrnt lo 
which lhat ideolog� properly characterized the entire popularc. 
Challopadhyaya thinks this demonstration of allwism permeating classical 
Indian philosophy shows that the "spiritualil) ·• Radhakrishnan credits LO 1l is 
a "fiction".21 While it seems to me that it doesn't follow from his argument in 
any evident wa}, the view that Indian philosophy's spirit uahly is a fiction !.ecms 
lo be endorsed by all four of the writers under dis<·us.sion. Of them, Dayai is 
possibly the most forthright in his arguments. 
Daya deelares. with Anikeev. that it is a mistake lo \iew Indian philosophy as 
parlkularly concerned \\.ilh spiritual libc•ralion. His reasons are more difficJlt to 
e\'aluate than in the case of the �Jarxist allack on Lhcism, primarily because 
whereas in the case of Chattopadhyaya's arguments il is reasonably cleat where 
he ic; theorizing and where he is reporling textual data, it is nol clear to wh1t ex­
tent Daya is offering persuasive definitions in the language of factual claims 
The crux of the problem Daya raises is: should we use the word "philosophy" 
in some appropriate wa}' drawn from conlt'mporary Western practices. or should 
we redefine il to fil a concept employed wllhin Indian philosophy itsetr. Daya 
prl'fcr:.; the former procecure. Adopting a standard Western understanding of 
"philosophy", Daya notes. one ma)' ha\'e a philosoph} of anything, and b:, that 
Loken. one may ha\e a ph.Josoph} of liberation among other things .. And that is 
the way Daya proposes lo view Indian philosoph)'. po111lmg oul that rndian 
philosophers have noL confined thcmsehcs to philosophy of liberation but have 
lrealcd in a rl'cognizabty philosophical manner a large number of matters 
apparently unconnected with liberatio n. In arguing his l'asc, he presents reasons 
for thinking both lhat lots of Indian philosophy has nothing to do with libera­
tion, and also that lols o f  lndian wrilin�s which are not philosophy do have lo 
do with liberatio n. He notes. corre<'tl y ,  that il was fashionable in writing on 
"sex, economics, medicine, grammar, and politics" 25 lo claim that study of t.he 
tract in progress would le:<.d lhe reader loward liberation, and he contends thal 
it was perfeclly natural for treatises which had no other particular connect.ion 
with liberation to be introduced with the same claim. Although he admit� lhat 
"probably . . .  mol��a was accepted as Lhe highest \alue and the ultimate goal of 
life by the whole of Indian culture;·26 Daya seems to sug�est that the fash on of 
associating treatises of all kinds with liber.ttion was ml'rely a social gambit in­
tended to gam respectability. That gambit was frequently window-dressing. he - /- -
thinks, particular!} in the case of lol{H.'al systems such as Nyaya and Vijnana\'ada 
Buddhism. He finds it "difficult to believe lhat anyone <:ould seriously brlieve 
that he or anyone else could achieve molr�a t hrough a knowledge of the types of 
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objects or ex perience to be found in lhe world or through a knowledge of the 
means of knowledge or the logical fallacies which are rclevanL in the field of 
reasoning and argumentation. It is not as if we alone are questioning the rele­
vance of these things lo molz�a. Rather, it is tlw tradition itself which decisively 
rejected these claims almost at the very time when they were being put for. 
ward."27 Daya doesn'l mdicate which texts he has in mind as a basis for the 
last remark. 
The word "phi loso ph}" is not a Sanskrit word. and there is no particular 
reason to suppose a priori that there is any slandardl) accepted term which 
translates our word •·philosophy". Thus one cannot quarrel .,., ilh Daya if he is 
suggest ing that it is possible to understand "ph ilosophy" as we in the West do, 
and thus to treal liberalion as one of the lhings one c.·nn philosophize aboul. 
Nevertheless, though it is a possible way, I think it is not likely to produce as 
many insights as the alternative rr.ethod, which is to d<>vise an account of 
" J ndian philosophy" which will retain the features of inquiry, etc., that chara<:· 
terize Western philosophy while specifying liberation as t.he central concept. 
within the subject-mat.ter o f  Indian philosophy, which is what th.e authors or the 
lexls actually specif), whalever Daya may think of their motives. l have two 
main kinds of reasons for saying Lhis, beyond whatever demonstration I may 
hope to ha,·e provided among the pages of my book PrC's11ppos1llons of India 's 
Philosophies. 
One kind of reason is this: that there 1s in India a traditional distinction 
among fields of knowledge, according to which treatises devoted to such fields 
may be divided according as they fall inlo arthafustra. ltamasastra dharma§Ostra 
or molz�asastra. This classificaLion overlaps the distinction of fields which Daya 
mentions-sex, economics, medicine, etc.-and reflects a celebrated notion about 
various aims or "orientations" toward life within which interest. in the subject· 
matter of a t.reatise might be expected. The fourfold classification I mention has 
a different logic, howe..,er, from the classification Daya has in mind. Daya would 
count philosophy, if I understand him, as one more in the lisl, in much the man· 
ner of a re,iew of the academic disciplines of a university, each of which has its 
appropriate subject-matter or methodology or something and is in that respect 
autonomous and different from all lhe others. The logir of the four puruiarlhas 
is rather different, and it explains otherwise what Daya is forced lo explain as a 
kind of social gambil which was actually window-dressing. For the logic o( the 
four aims of life is such that one who lranscends lhe first two b� coming to view 
life in terms of dharma does not thereby leave behind the points of view {sub· 
ject.matter, methodology) o f  the fit'l>t two but rather c.•ombines them into a new 
and more adequate overview of life. The same thing, in turn, i� said to happen 
when one ad,·ances toward moll�a or liberation. Since in lhis way the point of 
view of liberation not only constitutes the highest value and the ultimate goal, 
bul also represents the most adequa�e understanding of anything worth under· 
slanding, it is evident wh} treatises on all sorts of subjects were introduced in 
such a fashion lo suggest that the work would present its subject under the 
aspect of liberation. 
The second kind of reason l have for preferring my way of construing "Indian 
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philosophy" has nothing primarily to do with peculiarilies of India bul rnthcr 
has to do with u convictior. l have aboul philosophical inquiry, one which seems 
LO me ought Lo lead one to favor my approad1 to Indian thought. My convicli()n 
is Lhal philosophy is a rnomenl in every inquiry, ralher than a distinct kind of 
inquiry. 'l'his view is sometimes described as the view t.hat philosophy is "the 
queen of the sciences," t.hal is, that Lhe differences between the various sciences 
derive from a division o f  labor with regard to subject-matter, but thal Lhe 
canons of sound invest.igalions are constant despite this di vision o f  labor. and 
thal th� in Lerrelated lotalily o f  lhe various sciences should ultimately issue in a 
systematic account renecting the various discoveries of specific sciences. c·on­
dilioned and synthesized lbrough philosophical criticism. lf this vie\\ is correct, 
and I grant lhat it is only my conviction, lhen instead of viewing each "science" 
as a n  aulonomous discipline with respect to which one may or may noL philo­
sophize, one will view Lhe various sciences as specialized facets of the general 
pursuit of philosophy. Thus there is no special method of philosophy dist.incl 
from the method or methods ulilized in the several kinds of inquiry; rather. 
there are moments in any investigation where one will make observations, for­
mulaLe hypotheses and tesl them, and there are likewise moments in any inves­
tigation where one will renecl critically on the assumptions underlying lhe hypo­
theses. the procedures involved in lhe tesling, and the terms and concepts used 
i n  formulating the results of the inquir). But the same critical processes wh1t·h 
are used in the latter moments must be presenl during tbe former moments as 
well. and conversely critical reflect.ion on rnelhod is empty and will go astra� 
unless it is carried on in full knowledge of the substance of the subJeCl·matter lo 
which Lhe method is Lo be applied. 
'l'he advantage of Lakin� philosophy this way is that it involves no a priori 
assu mpLions abouL distinctions which may subsequently obslrucL the progress or 
inquiry. TC one supposes one knows in advance Lhe limits of philosophy, because 
it is taken lo have a nature of its own apart from ils function within what are 
taken to othPr branches of knowledge, one can easil) cut off philosophy from 
the self·correclive proces.5es which characlerize scientific tnquiry. R) viewing 
knowledge as an integrated process one minimizes the temptation to suppose 
there are shortculs lo truth which one shields from criticisrn by stipulating that 
these shortcuts constitute "true philosophical method.'' 
If il is constructive lo hterpret philosoph)' in the way I have descri bed, t hen 
it is worth noting Lhal ii. f'.ts the interpretation of lndian p hilosoph} that I pro­
pose. For the search for liberation is a search for an ultimate understand111g of 
the lrulh, and that is the same aim Lhat characterizes scienti fic 111quiry when 
such inquiry is viewed in Ls widest and most interrelated sense. Thus the quest 
for liberation involves an intellectual component. though doubtless 1t is not ex­
hausted in inlelleclual in� uiry. I have argued previously thal this intellectual 
component can in the case of Indian philosophy be best. understood as t.he 
effort Lo remove the doubts and fears which. deriving from skeplica and 
fatalistic views, threaten to render a person m<·apable of undertaking lhe quesl. 
Daya misunderstands me at lhis point, thinking that I hold the quest for 
liberation lo involve only procedures which are nol intellectual. He ex.presses 
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doubt thal "inl<>llectual difficulties of a purely rational and cognili\C kind can 
c;tand in the wa) of the practical pursuit or ends which ar<' non-cogniti,e, non­
intellectual, and non-ralional in nature:·28 The assumption that the quest is 
non-cognitive, elc .• is, how1e,·er. his, noL mine. ,\nd it is this assumption that lies 
at the root of his argumenl. For if the quest for liberation invol\e� intellectual as 
well as non-intcllt?clual moments. and if llberdtion represents among other thing!> 
ao ideal slate or cognitive attainment toward which all branches of inquiry ul· 
Limately aim. lht>n the contrast between what he thinks of as philosoph) and 
what he Lakl'S to be> the non-ralional pursuit of liberation <·ollapws. 
Daya, 111 trying lo dh·orce philosophy from an} e:>sential concern wilh 
liberation, ha� seemed Lo attack the view of Indian philosophy as "o,;pirilual" by 
persuasively redefining the quest for liberation as non-rnlional so that plulosophy 
plays no µarL in either science or religion but stands as some L11ird thing un· 
connected in any essenlia I way with either. 'l'he quesl for liberation is Loo 
spiritual. and rational inquiry not spiritual enough, lo idenlif} with philosophy­
lhat sel!ms lo be Daya's conclusion. 
That the proper place for philosophy is somewhere between failh and reason 
is an inlerest ing Lhoughl, and one whose rele,·ance to our discus.c;ion is more di· 
reel t han may al first appear. We are witnessing today another round in the 
ceaseles.c; balllc between romanlics and classicists, Nietzsche's Oionys1ans and 
Apollonians; only nowadays, since the conflict. has become so time-worn. both 
sides have laken 011 Lhe aspect of losers. The defenders or lradilional faiths. 
unable lo demonstrate Lheir beliefs Lhrough reasoned argumenl, make a \'irtue 
of lhe irrationalily of religious belief. To belie\e because it is absurd is argued lo 
be justifiable because il leads to psychological health, providing the n�eded anli· 
dote to the emptine� or antisepllc scient1sm. Traditional defenses of lhe intel· 
lect as the sole guide to the good life hme tended to accept a good many or the 
assumptions thnt make their opponents' anti-intellectualisms superficially attrac· 
live. Apologists for the life of reason too often agree thal sdent·e is limited in 
its applications. antiseptic in ils \alues, a champion of altitudes which everyone 
knows to be unhealth}. Both sides are caught in practical inconsistencies: the 
irrationalist feels the need of showing by reason the ralionaliL} of b<.'ing irra­
tional. th<.' rationalist admits that reason itself cuts al the heart of his defense 
of ralionalism. 
Under these circumstances there is an understandable attraction lo be found 
in a philosophy which denies the common assumptions whic.:h appear to damn 
both rationalism and irrationalism. Indeed, one is inclined lo enshrine the need 
for such a philosophy by deciding to talk in such a way that a method will nol 
be called truly "philosophical" unless il avoids both extremes, extremes which 
can Lhen be C"haracterized as "religion" on Llie one hand and "sdcnce" on the 
other. J\rriving al this point Lhrough whal is for the moment a verbal maneuver. 
one searches for something Lhat is "Lme philosophy". 'l'he exciting candidates 
for this role in contemporary affairs are those would-be world-vi<'ws which claim 
to avoid the assumptions, reviewed abo,·e. common to lht- defenders or bolh 
reason and unreason. 
Antipathy toward both the life guided by theolog) and lhal guided by tech· 
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nology is a t'ashion of the day. and it is lempling for philosophers who wish lo 
makt> their thoughl rele\'rnt to contemporary trends lo argue that ·heir philos­
ophy is lht! true philosop::i} in that il escapes the shortcomings of rl'ligious and 
scientific philosoph) . l \\Onder whether lhe current burgeoning of interest in 
Orit>nlal philosophy is no, closel) connet:ted with this conc:f:'rn for a philosophy 
\\hi ch is neilher theological nor technological'! This hypot hcsis is strcng.hened 
when one notes that the types or Eastern thoul(ht whkh grab the � oung person 
toda} art> those types-nolabl} Zen Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta '' h1ch are 
anti-rational (anti-science) without being theistic. 
'l'hroughoul the history of lndian thought there has re�ularl) occurred pllilo­
sophkal confrontation between three kinds of philosophers. On the one hand 
llwrc: hnvc been the philosophies which foal un.'cl ralional mtil hods of inves­
tigation, treating man and nature alike as amenable lo nwtaphyskttl and 
psychological analysis based upon sense-experience, and lhis without residue, 
llwr<' being nothing aboul man and nature which is lntrinskally beyond ex­
perimental investigation. Such philosophies in India have been those of the 
Cardikas. the Jains, penaps some Buddhists of the Sannsti,·ada sorl, and 
Nyaya· Vaite�ika. A second kjnd of philosophy has hcen lhal born from scclar­
ian theological concerns: here devolion is paramount, and philosophy is dewed 
as the apologetic needed to place God in an appropr111tc sellinJ! conduch·e to 
appropriat� modes of worship. One must suppose that such philosophies ha\'e 
always existed in regional or local forms, although our e\'idenct.> .iboul l 1em in 
l'arly times is scanty. The later bhallli mo\'ements, which rclt.>brale IO\'C for and 
reOl'rling lhe di\'ine. mo\-e the masses today and haH' <.'l(•arly done so ror se\·eral 
<·cnturics to an extent thal philosophies more exlensiwly trc>alt•d in hi-.Lories 
ha,·c not. 
But the type of philosoph} which most inlellcctuab both in and ouhide of 
Asia ha\'c round most challenging has been 1wither of the abo\l'. but a third sorl. 
one whost• exposition in India came 111 the st·hools or l\Iadh}amika Buddhism. 
�specially through the writings of and about NjigarJuna. and in Ad\'aita Veda nta. 
especially through the writings of and about Sa111kara. l�lscwhere29 I ha\'e sug­
gested one might term these "leap'" philosophies. sinl·t• lhcy esclU.'\\ explanations 
In lNms of C'ausnlily wilh respect to ultimate mutters. Strwtly, however. my 
classifiN1tion included devotional philosophies (of Lhe st•t·oncl sort mrnltoned) as 
well us Madhyamika and Advaita. and so I went 011 to distinguish "do-il­
yoursclf" l<•ap philosophies from the rest, tlw do-It )'ourself on<'s being those or 
Maclhyam1ka and J\dvaita. 
In my account, then, the fundamenlal oppositiun is betw<1t•11 the first sort of 
philosophic-al stance and �he other two, between philosophies whi<'h in\'estigate 
man and thr world Lhrougb rational (i.e., scienl.ifir) methods und Lhos<' which do 
not do so or at any rate do not allow that everything n•lf:'\'anl can be in\esli&aled 
in that manner. The division between the scrond and third kinds of Indian phi­
losoph)' appears, lhen, as d division suborclinall' lo the major distinction b�tween 
the first kind and the other two. But 1 suspect that Lhis wa) or \'iewing the 
matter may not fit current fashion. And that, if true, is or considerable inleresl 
in our discussion today. 
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Why should writers such as Anikeev, Chattopadhyaya and Riepe. apparently 
commiited Lo one or anol.her sort o f  materialistic view, find lndian thought 
lhreatening enough to warrant lhe amount and kind or attention they pay to it.? 
I am not sure o f  the answer, but one might hypothesize that the amount of 
attention will be determined by the extent to which contemporary interest in 
Oriental philosophies increases. and that the lli11d o[ allenlion given it will stem 
irom the kind of threat it appears to pose to the materialist. And whether they 
realize it or not, so it may further t:e suggested, the threat posed comes from Lhe 
claim that philosophy. or at least a certain kind of philosophy. can find a way 
between the horns of the contemporary dilemma between theology and tech­
nology, faith and reason. 
Let me explore for a bit this line of thought. admiUing all the while that. it 
may be completely wide of the r:tark as prophecy. A well-known feature o f  
)1arxisl philosophy is its claim to provide a \'iewpoint from which the historical 
developments leading from religion lo science. not lo speak of those leading 
from slavery lo freedom of the masses, can best be understood. In keeping with 
that conception o f  l\larxist philosophy, the defender of Marxism characteris­
tically glorifies scientific method and denigrates irralionalism as exhibited in 
pre·scienWic modes o f  thought wh:ch he will characterize as passl remnants of 
religious dominance. Jn an age in which the a<:•1 ie,·emenls of science dazzle us 
into respecl, whatever our assessment of its applications, associating one's philos­
ophy with the pme spirit. of scientific method seems sound strategy, whatever 
one might wish Lo say aboul lhe consislency of :\larxist dogma with the spirit of 
scientific inquiry. But suppose lha� revulsion with Lhe successes of science so 
overcome a generation that "science". "reason" and associated words become 
terms of abuse, and that people come lo look Lo philosophy not as support for 
science or religion but rather as a source of a new sort o[ synthesis transcending 
an alleged antithesis between those Lwo'! 
An alert philosopher acquainted with Indian thought might. under such cir­
cumstances. be able lo stir up a good deal of interest by a timely exposition o f  
Nagarj una's or Samkara's philosophy, no doubt. modified somewhat to m the 
Lime and situation. Madhyamika and Aclvaila pro,·ide attracti\le candidates for 
the role of true philosophy under such circumstances. Though neither one is 
theistic they each allow for slages along life's way in which worship is an appro­
priate guiding feature in a lifetime. Li kewise Lheir attitude is not to deny the 
worth of scientific im·esligalions but rather to limil the scope of science in what 
will seem under the hypothesized c1rcu mstances to be a fully justified manner. 
The upshot is the mapping out of lhe history of an individual personality (which 
might perhaps be generalized by ' clever expositor into a map of collective 
human history) indicating stages through which the seeker must. pass on his way 
to freedom (which again Lhe clever expositor will be able to describe in terms 
attraclive to the coming generations) . 
Suppose, now, you are a Marxist, or at least a malerialist, philosopher faced 
with the growing popularity of such a view? Whal will your strategy be? Your 
view is that the only defensible atti�ude to contemporary vicissitudes is a faith 
in rational methods of science .vhich you hold will issue in a vindication of cer-
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tain metaphysical theses, but the new philosophy holds I.hat the attitude you 
celebrate is merely a stage along life's way, due to be transcended about now! 
As a Marxist with a philosophy of history you may well feel you have been up· 
staged by Lhe \el'} same procedures you have found useful in setting aside your 
previous opponenLc;-the procedure of writing the opposilion off as a remnant or 
a bygone era. You now face the problem of how to reacl when threatened in 
lhis fashion. 
The difficulty of the position stems in good part from the problem posed hy 
the supposed popularity of Madhyamika or Advaita. The materialist is appar· 
ently in a position of either beating them al their own game or joining them. 
Either line of work is fraught with danger, however. 
Suppose one tries to bec:.t them at their own game. One might. e.g .• argue thal 
Lhe e\idence shows that the dialeclical advance of human history favors the 
Marxist reconstruction against the Indian one. If challenged one cites in defense 
appeals to the method of science as justifying one's faith in this regard. But, 
leaving aside the question whether the evidence does in fact �upport Marxism 
against Indian reconstructions of history, it should be evident that any defense 
of the materialist posilion based on an appeal to the supremacy of scienlifi<' 
methods begs the question. It is precisely the strength of Lhe "Indian" position 
that it can dismiss the adducing of scienlific evidence as the child's play of t.ho� 
who have noL yet arrived at the transition point leading to Lhe new st�ge in 
human history. 
I f  one despairs of this method of defending materialism, one might then try 
to beat the "lndians" by joining them. Clearly this looks like admission of 
defeat, unless one can assimilate the assumptions of the "Indian" position in 
such a way as to preserve the fundamental features of materialism. One :night 
try to do that by accepting the position now arrived at, one in which men feel 
the need of a stage cor.responding to lhe one envisaged in Madhyamiirn or 
Vedanta, as a stage on the way. superior to previous stages which featured 
science or religion, but somehow Lo convince people that this stage is penulli· 
mate and that the ultimate stage will conform to materialist or Marxist specifi· 
cations. The question is-how will one convince the people of that? If one 
proposes to do it by argument one is left open Lo ibe rebuUaJ as before, Ll1at 
one's position depends upon one's listeners' accepting the superiority of rational 
procedures in arriving at convictions. So, one should probably avoid argumen. 
t.ation in defending this Une or response to the putative situation: the counsel 
should rather be lo proceed appropriately through actions premissed upon the 
superiority of rational methods, actions whiclh might include the use oC per· 
suasive language to move men Lo further action lbut which should not feature any 
extensive aUempt to justify the appropriateness of one's choice of how to act. 
This rehearsal of options that might occur to a materialist or Marxist under a 
certain kind of circumstance seems lo me, despite the circumstance not actually 
holding at the present lime, to help in explaining why the writers we have been 
considering speak the way they do. Anikeev, if I read him rightly, prefers Lo 
speak from a position of s�rength. His view is that Indian philosophy has always 
featured materialistic doctrines, and he is concerned to glorHy those scholars. 
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notably Russian ones, who have discerned this fact. Movements within Indian 
philosophy which run counter to materialism are assumed to be of less 1mpor· 
lance; perhaps the very allegation of their occurrence is frequently an aberration 
created by lhe mistaken reatlings of bad scholars biased toward religious con· 
cerns. But there is Lillie attempt by Anikeev to arg�ie the point, which is just as 
well, since it is not al all plausible that Madhyamika and Advaita didn't occur at 
all, nor is it plausible to say that tbey have been misconstrued as anti·malerialist. 
Under the circumstances a Marxist or materialist laking this line does best to 
avoid exploring the evicience loo closely. 
Chattopadhyaya, however, wades right in. By cleverly equating anti·material· 
ism with theism, and then arguing that it follows that atheism (perhaps better 
"non·lheism'') supports materialism, he manages to make a try al beating the do· 
it·yourself leap philosophers at their own game. But, as we have seen, the histor­
ical case depends on allowing Chattopadhyaya the privilege of choosing the 
rules of the game; ir one doesn't accepl this estimate of who are importanl 
philosophers and which the import.ant ages in the history of Indian philosophy, 
his case does noL amounL to much. But more fundamentally the case depends on 
our being willing to classify Madhyamika as atheistic and so anti-spirilualisL 
(- materialist), and then finally just to ignore Advaita VedanLa altogether 
(Chattopadhyaya has liltle to say about iL). A case thal requires us to mis· 
interpret or ignore the evidence against it, particularly when the evidence in· 
volves the most reknowned systerr.s within Buddhism and IIinduism, is hardly a 
convincing one. 
Riepe, l think, feels the difficulty rather acutely. In a recent piece entitled 
''Critique of idealistic naturalism: methodological pollution in the main stream 
of American phi losophy"30 he complains about the "meLhodological mono­
mania"31 of American naturalists, deploring their penchant for discussing 
method interminably without getting on to specify ways in which their philo· 
sophical posit ion can be put to work in human affairs. Perhaps the i\1arxist 
should likewise counsel us to forget about methodology and advise us merely to 
act upon il. In this way perhaps Marxism can provide for the naturalistic 
revi\"al in India, whose green shoots Riepe finds \·isible everywhere, the necessary 
nourishment which will enable it  lo outgrow the attitudes characteristic of 
classical Indian thought. 
I confess, howe,·er, that l find irresponsible the notion that in order to stay 
abreast in popularity polls a philosopher should avoid arguing in his own defense. 
And in any case he is just as likely lo lose the particular contest in question. For 
the opposi1ion-Madhyamika and Advaita-are aL no loss for words when it 
comes lo defending their position by attacking that of others. Nor do lhey f:eel 
any difficully in using the very rational methods which, according to their 
assumptions, stem from a stage of .houghL now withering away. So the maleri· 
alist who refuses to argue because whatever he says will be held against him and 
made lhe basis for a loss in the popularity of his position puts himself at a hope­
less disadvantage to no purpose. 
Scienlism, f suspect, will never be a really popular philosophy, although it 
may despite that come lo be much more widely accepted than it is now. l t  won't 
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be popular in that it appeals nol Lo the hearl b ul lo the head, so to speak. I think 
the malerialist. �Iarxisl or not. is probably going to ha\'e to accept thal and li\'e 
with il. But il will be enough if materialism gains and bolds the respect of 
lhoughLful human beings capable of appreciating lhe full nature of the human 
predicament. ll should aim to do that by refusing Lo seek shortcuts in philos· 
opby. Its position should be that there is no "true philosophy" which solves the 
dilemma of faith versus reason. Madhyamika and Ad\'aita, insofar as lhey refuse 
Lo use rational methods to the full in defending their doclrines, are necessarily 
on the side of faith and against the side of reason. ln a paper entitled "The ethics 
of belief,"32 prepared for and delivered lo this Center a year ago, Brand 
Blanshard shows how insidious are lhe temptations to treat important matters, 
such as religious ones, as i f  the resuJls of believing might outweigh the 
rationaliLy of what is believed. Professor Blanshard eloquently argues that the 
philosophers must resist such lemplations, no matter how '"drear}' and negati\·e 
all this must sound lo those whose belief is unqueslioning, exuberant, and joy· 
ful."33 Adherence to sLrict canons of inference and evidence is, to repeat, nol 
likely lo win popularity polls. Yel it seems Lo me to be the indispensable com· 
milmenl which lhe materialist must make. 
The honesty required , however, makes il incumbenl upon the materialisl­
Marxisl or otherwise-to keep an open mind about the truth of maleriali>m il· 
self. Spiritualism, or idealism, or monism, or whatever is conceived lo be con· 
trary Lo materialism, must be given a complel,ely fair hearing-thaL is wbat. hon· 
esty in philosophy involves. When Anikee\1 complains lhat Indian philosophy has 
been wrongly accused or being "indifferent to scientific methods" he is attempt­
ing to indicate that lndian philosophy. of whatever persuasion. has generally 
been honest in its methods of inquiry. Such is lhe mark of what truly deserves 
the name of "philosophy", he is suggesting, and those who propose Lo interpret 
Indian philosophy as shot through with spiritualism are doing it an injustice, 
since that interpretation �eems to imply that Indian philosophers have, along 
with religious apologists within other religious tradilions. trealed reason as sub· 
sen1enL lo other methods. 
Is Indian philosophy guilty of treating reason as subservienL to other 
methods-does it counsel shortcuts to truth? IL  may seem, from what has 
already been sajd, that some styles in Indian philosophy have been guilty of this, 
and not surprisingly the} have been the styles which have gained lhe most popu­
lar appeal. But even Lhis estimate may be hasty. Suppose the Madhyamika 
Buddhist, such as Nagarju:ia, is right, and lhat the absolutely honest pressing of 
rational methods will lead to nothing but endless antinomies-will it not be the 
honest conclusion in Lhis situat.ion to draw no conclusion except that reason is 
untrustworthy? It  is not necessarily dishonest to appeal to reason in order to 
show its emptin0$. Profe-5.Sor Blanshard, it  may be worth recalling, who sounds 
the clarion caU for complete honesty in philosophical methods, is known as the 
chief contemporary champion of idealism in this country. He apparently does 
not find materialism to be the necessary outcome of adherence to strict canons 
of reasoning. 
The fact is that in neither lndia nor the Western world has it been pos.9ble lo 
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achieve consensus among philosophers as to just which beliefs are dictated by 
adhering honesty to strict canons of reasoning. Anikeev is certainly correct in 
denying that Indian philosophy is indifferent to scientific methods: if a different 
impression has been �i\'en to Lhe world al large it has been because of an unfor­
tunate desire on the part of too many expositors of Indian philosophy to cater 
to lhe popularity of religious modes of thought. Anikeev sees all lhis. What he 
perhaps fails to see is that it remains possible that the application of just those 
scientific methods may yield the opposite results from those that �1arxism ex­
pects. Similarly, Chatlopad hyaya rightly calls attention to overlooked applica­
tions of honest reasoning put to use to debunk theism in India; what doesn't 
follow, though he seems to think it does, is that theism is false and his own 
alternative true. Chatlopadhyaya and Riepe seem lo think that appreciation or a 
sound "socio-historical approach" constitutes sufficient reason to accept 
materialism. The claim, however, smells suspiciously of dogma, pseudo-scien­
tific met.hods offered in place of honest consideration of evidence and recogni· 
lion of the limils of our present knowledge. IL is not that they may not be right; 
it is rather that, even if they are, it is important thal we not hasten uncritically 
to their conclusion. but consider it impartially. objectively, and extendedly, 
however much it may pain us lo do so. 
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